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1 NEw LIBERALS-AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
A great deal of international relations theory defines itself in relation to the three 
traditions (Wight 1991). In the past two decades, this act of self-definition has taken 
two broad forms. In one case, scholars have sought to transcend these traditions 
and their various affiliates. For them, Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, and John 
Locke establish modernity. Writing that configures these individuals as central, 
therefore, is itself keyed into a particular moment in time and a particular way 
of thinking through the world. The work of poststructuralists or critical theorists, 
then, is an expression of distance from, and dissatisfaction with, these categories of 
enlightenment thought reproduced in much international relations theorizing (Der 
Derian 1992; Walker 1993). This is work that positions itself as after the three great 
projects of modernity (DerDerian and Shapiro 1989 ). 
A less iconoclastic (perhaps less baleful) form of critique works within these 
traditions and has sought to deepen and extend the insights found in the classical 
categories. The neo-n eo debates are an obvious example of this refinement project. 
More recently, though, the two most appealing intellectual refurbishments have 
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occurred in the work of constructivists and new liberals. Constructivists have 
sought to understand the way in which ideas are socially constitutive. Put bluntly, 
\ while actors have ideas, it is true also that ideas have actors. One aspect of this, 
\important for the purposes of this chapter, is that international legal norms are 
~ought to perform a dynamic role in constituting the global political order. 
New liberalism, the subject of this chapter, makes two important contributions. 
First, it wants to place liberal theory on a scientific footing and offer it (at least) 
parity with the other major paradigms of international relations thought (by giving 
it empirical bite, by grounding it in testable propositions, by bringing some co-
herence to its textual formulations) (this is Andrew Moravcsik's project). Secondly, 
it takes the vague entreaties of Wilsonian liberalism and the outmoded sovereign-
tisms (statisms) of public international law, and converts them into a legal theory 
about how norms are created and how they operate in a world defined not by the 
interaction of opaque nation states but by transgovernmentalism: a multileveled 
international law, policy, and politics operating across highly permeable national 
boundaries (this is Anne-Marie Slaughter's project). These projects have been, 
deservedly, celebrated. They are imaginative and supple responses to a changed 
global environment. 
In order to untangle some of the key propositions of new liberalism, I propose 
to consider three key new liberal texts. These are Moravcsik's "Taking Preferences 
Seriously" (1997), Slaughter's A New World Order (2004), and the recent Princeton 
Project's Forging a World of Liberty under Law (Ikenberry and Slaughter 2006). The 
first text is new liberalism's methodological blueprint; it is a persuasive, widely read, 
and considered piece of theorizing that sought to position new liberalism alongside 
the great "isms" of international relations theory. The second text, Slaughter's A 
New World Order, seeks to describe a world already transformed by the norms and 
institutions produced by liberal law and politics. This represents a move from the 
sometimes dry theorizing ofMoravcsik (1997) to a more popular normativism. The 
third text marks the first explicit effort to present new liberal theory as government 
policy. Forging a World of Liberty self-consciously mimics the style and intentions 
of the George W. Bush administration's two National Security Strategies (e.g. White 
House 2006). This prospectus for US foreign policy combines the feel-good norma-
tivity of new world order with a hard-headed pragmatism about violence and war; 
it as an approximation of what new liberal foreign relations might look like. 
2 TAKING PREFERENCES TOO SERIOUSLy 
·········································································································································· 
Moravcsik (1997) faces a familiar liberal paradox-how to be liberal and scien-
tific, or how to combine the crusading spirit of liberal policy with heavyweight 
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international relations theory. His response is to do away largely with liberalism's 
ethical (or political) tendencies altogether. The "non-ideological, non-utopian" 
project of Moravcsik involves liberating liberalism from its normative biases (its 
celebration of progress, its concerns about poverty and redistribution, its benev-
olent paternalism) by predicating liberal theory on the strategic calculations and 
interactions of rational persons, groups of whom at the domestic level determine 
state interests and preferences at the international level. 
How, then, might we characterize the "ethics of new liberalism?" This denuded 
liberalism ofMoravcsik's is illuminating as a description of strategic interaction, but 
it leaves some questions unanswered. These can be divided into a set of questions 
around the identity of the "political," and a tranche of problems surrounding 
Moravcsik's assumptions about the state. 
First, to the problem of politics; there is little discussion of how rational actors 
come to possess preferences in the first place (Moravcsik 1997, 517). In particular, 
the possibility that there exists some sort of feedback loop in which political and 
strategic interaction might play a role in defining preferences and demands is not 
acknowledged. According to Moravcsik (1997, 517), people have tastes, commit-
ments, and endowments, but these are regarded as somehow prior to politics. In-
dividuals bring these attributes to politics; political life, then, involves competition 
and cooperation between and among these preconstituted actors. Their tastes and 
commitments are "pre-political" (Reus-Smit 2001), though their "deep, irrecon-
cilable differences in beliefs about the provisions of public goods ... " (Moravcsik 
1997, 517) presumably are political. This distinction between the pre-political (the 
social?) and the political is surely questionable. Is it plausible, for example, to think 
of a person brought up, say, as a Labour Party supporter in England possessing a 
set of "social commitments" (held independently of politics) and a repertoire of 
"beliefs" (forged, engaged, and modified in political action)? 
A second problem with new liberalism is the way in which it conceives 
of the state. State preferences are shaped and constituted at the domestic level by 
the political interplay of individuals and groups seeking to maximize leverage at the 
international level. Once these interests have been constituted, they remain largely 
unmodified by the operation of other actors in the international system. These fun-
damental preferences may shift but only in response to political reconfigurations at 
the domestic level (Moravcsik 1997, 519). This theoretical construct has the merit of 
dislodging some realist assumptions about the universalizability and homogeneity 
of state behavior (for example, that states will always maximize security or defend 
sovereignty), but what it replaces them with is a set of unsustainable demarcations 
between national and international space. This is problematic in two respects. First, 
it resurrects the very distinction between international and domestic politics that 
much liberal theory was supposed to eliminate and, secondly, it suggests that "fun-
damental preferences," in thrall to political reorientations internally, are nonethe-
less independent of convulsions or changes in the international environment. This 
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version of new liberalism, then, has too little to say about the way in which states 
establish self-understandings as a consequence of their international position and 
regardless of the caprices of internally constituted elites (Australia's self-image as a 
"good international citizen" is an example of this). 
The deeper question about Moravcsik's strategy. is whether liberal states do 
behave differently, as new liberalism predicts that they will. This question links 
Moravcsik's work to Slaughter's more transparently normative agenda. If states' 
behavior is conditioned by their internal preferences, then this has very great im-
plications for international order generally. It means, for example, that the realist 
focus on material power, the institutionalist faith in international machinery, and 
the legalist obsession with creating and identifying autonomous norms are each 
in their own way misplaced, and likely to generate inconclusive or disappointing 
research agendas and errant policy. For new liberals, norms and institutions will 
work better, and power will be rendered relatively peripheral, among states where 
domestic preferences are mutually reinforcing. Moravcsik argues that both war 
and intensified cooperation can be explained by the configuration of domestic 
preferences. So, war in the twentieth century is marked by global conflict between 
rival ideologies (communism, liberalism, and fascism), while supranational co-
operation (involving the pooling of sovereignty) is a feature of regions in which 
there is uniform commitment to "democratic norms" (Moravcsik 1997, 527). The 
most salient and certainly most disseminated insight derived from all this is the 
democratic peace: "as close as anything we have to. an empirical law in international 
relations" (Russett 1993, 139, quoting Jack Levy). As Moravcsik (1997, 531) puts it: 
"Liberal democratic institutions tend not to provoke such [major] wars because 
influence is placed in the hands of those who must expend blood and treasure and 
the leaders they choose." 
Liberal states, though, have been far from pacific in their relations with other 
states (including embryonic democracies). The two most recent large-scale aggres-
sions (in Kosovo and Iraq) have been committed by liberal coalitions. 1 Indeed, 
there may be three reasons why liberal societies have a greater propensity to go 
to war than other states. First, late-modern liberal polities have become hugely 
adept at shaping and cajoling public opinion. Secondly, it is not at all clear, contra 
Moravcsik, that liberal states must expend (much) blood in pursuing contempo-
rary war (and are accordingly more likely to be restrained by citizens bearing the 
costs of those wars). Thirdly, the north Atlantic states now regard themselves as 
representatives of humanity (fighting humanitarian wars or wars against terror). 
No longer engaged in war at all but rather in what Carl Schmitt (2003) called "pest 
control," they are free to engage in armed action without the stigma of "war." What 
we are left with is not the democratic peace but the abolition of war as a juridical 
1 I have used a neutral definition of aggression derived from the United Nations 1974 Definition on 
Aggression. 
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or political category and its displacement by forms of violence in the name of 
humanity (Simpson 2004a ). -
Ultimately, preferences-changeable, protean, contingent not on values but on 
success, and subject to linguistic reformulations-may turn out to be poor pre-
dictors of behavior in the sphere of war. But what of lib~ralism in other domains? 
Is it the case that liberal states are more likely to adopt and support international 
legal rules (based largely, after all, on liberal principles)? Here I turn to the work of 
Slaughter. 
3 THE ETHICS oF A NEw WoRLD ORDER 
............................................................................................................................................ 
Slaughter's work has two related strands. The first is a magnification and clarifica-
tion of the new liberal commitment to distinguishing between liberal and illiberal 
states. This distinction is at the heart of some of this work, and generates a particular 
and heterodox view of international law. Public international law, traditionally a 
body of law that treated sovereigns as equals, is reinterpreted as a system whose 
subjects are to be differentiated for methodological and normative reasons. The 
problem of compliance, international law's bete noire, is solved by reference to the 
domestic preferences of relevant actors; liberal states comply, illiberal states defect. 
The task of international law is to promote liberal democracy in order to secure an 
internally generated culture of compliance. 
The second strand involves de-emphasizing the state altogether in favor of 
"transgovernmentalism." The thankless, professional task of imposing liberal 
norms on illiberal agents (traditional international law) is abandoned or, at least, 
downgraded in favor of encouraging transnational judicial cooperation among 
liberal judicial organs (Slaughter 1995; 2004); developing informal networks of 
like-minded government instrumentalities (Slaughter 1997; 2oo4); prompting re-
calcitrant legislators to collaborate across borders (Slaughter 2004), and build for-
mal institutions and informal machineries composed of liberal states (Slaughter 
1994). 
Before considering transgovernmentalism as a theory of governance, I want to 
return to the first precept of Slaughter's work and consider the behavioral suppo-
sitions that undergird it. Are liberal states better behaved? Or, to ask the question 
differently, do liberal states tend to comply with international law more regularly 
than nonliberal states, as we would anticipate from a reading of Moravcsik (1997 )? 
The answers are equivocal. Frequently, liberal states have pursued war in defiance 
of existing legal frameworks. In the area of violence and force (always a realist 
stronghold), it is not the case that liberal states have been more compliant with the 
international legal norms drafted in 1945 making the unilateral use of force illegal. 
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Breaches of the nonintervention norm have been widespread (often to depose 
democratically elected governments, for example in Chile and Guatemala). Neither 
liberal institutions nor liberal law has greatly constrained the appetite of liberal 
states for military intervention (Franck 1970). 
In the case of participation in international judicial institutions, the evidence 
is again ambiguous. The International Court of Justice (a Wilsonian institution 
through and through) has failed to attract the support of the major liberal powers. 
It seems that factors other than domestic configurations or interest group dynamics 
seem to be critical in determining commitment to the international rule of law in 
this sphere at least. 
The human rights and humanitarian law fields, each imbued with liberal ideals, 
have not always garnered the support of liberal states either. Australia, a state with 
compulsory voting and therefore very high rates of participation in the democratic 
process, has adopted an increasingly hostile attitude toward humai1 rights norms 
in recent years. The United States, meanwhile, is now notorious for its rejection 
of several important multilateral initiatives (for example, the Ottawa Convention 
banning landmines, and the International Criminal Court Statute), and its com-
mitment to human rights institutions and norms has been patchy to say the least. 
Meanwhile, Jose Alvarez has documented many other ways in which liberal states 
do not behave better (with respect to participation in environmental regimes (2001, 
205), in the adoption of common trade commitments (2001, 207), or in their 
enthusiasm for regional human rights machinery (2001, 222)). 
Indeed, it may be that the ethics of liberalism obstructs the sort of convergences 
that new liberalism describes and prescribes. If liberals are right about the norma-
tive and analytic priority to be accorded representative interests within states, then 
this might lead to an expectation that liberal states and domestic institutions will 
scrutinize and reject many international legal norms. It might also suggest that this 
ought to occur given the sentiments of the internally constituted elites. 
But perhaps little of this matters when states themselves are being superseded, 
and here I turn to the transgovernmental aspect of Slaughter's work. Her most 
recent book, A New World Order, is imbued with a sort of Wilsonian American 
optimism (she admits as much at one point (2004, 257)) but one that departs from 
both Woodrow Wilson's reliance on states as the engines of change, and the roman-
tic claims of cosmopolitans. 2 The dream of powerful public institutions or world 
government has been superseded by an embryonic reality of world governance. 
This is manifesto and diagnosis at the same time. What makes Slaughter's work so 
attractive is that she takes an existing set of relationships, encompassing everything 
from international conferences of judges to ad hoc mechanisms for economic 
management to regulatory cooperation across borders, and translates them into a 
theory of global governance or world law. Then she calls for the deepening of these 
2 Parts of the discussion in this section arc drawn from Simpson (2004b). 
' 
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relationships and offers some prescriptions for making this incipient system both 
just and effective. 
Her recent work is a corrective to the dominant view that diplomacy is about 
executive-level inter-state exchange. It is not that law and politics do not continue 
to be managed and developed at these executive levels; rather, Slaughter's argument 
goes, it gets done in many other places as well. While the global media remain 
fixated on the elected leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
France, the stuff of global law is being molded and transformed in other places, 
by other people-by the Bank for International Settlements, by the International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors, by the Committee on International Judicial 
Relations, or by the Global Parliamentarians. 
This is apiece with Slaughter's career-long commitment to demolishing the im-
age of states as monolithic unitary actors (as in "the United States is opposed to 
the International Criminal Court") or organized around the inclinations of great 
men (as in "Blair and Bush have plans for the international order"). Billiard balls 
are displaced by "regulatory, judicial and legislative channels" (Slaughter 2004, 5) 
through which parts of states engage with each other transnationally. In this way, 
Slaughter purports to solve a paradox of global relations: We need more govern-. 
ment but we want less. The answer is found in the transition from government 
(hierarchical, sometimes sclerotic, inflexible, and inattentive) to governance (mul-
tiple, lateral, adaptable, permeable), and from the unitary state ("Blair;' the "United 
Kingdom") to the disaggregated state (Britain's regulators, legislators, and judges, 
among others). At the same time, Slaughter seeks to dislodge a cliched view of the 
world in which the hegemony of the great powers or rapacity of global capital is 
tempered only by civil, nongovernmental society. This view merely opposes the 
"passion" (of nongovernmental organizations) to the "interests" (of governments) 
and "profit-motive" (of corporate actors). What is required to keep all these ele-
ments in check is the neutral expertise of transnational actors; a technocratic turn, 
in other words, toward networks of regulators, judges, and legislators engaging in 
three types of behavior: information or cooperation, enforcement or compliance, 
and harmonization or convergence. 
In the networked world order, regulatory, judicial, and legislative networks will 
spread. Networks of networks, such as the Commonwealth or the Asia-Pacific Eco-
nomic Cooperation, will facilitate the business of global interaction, while vertical 
networks make transgovernmentalism more effective and international organiza-
tions continue to foster and encourage networks. 
Slaughter's work, then, is a retort to two highly fashionable images of interna-
tional society: the hegemony of the great powers and the power of civil society. At 
this level, it succeeds. It alerts us to the rise of an international technocracy capable 
of wielding power or converting soft power into hard power. In the remainder 
of this section, I want to pursue two possible lines of critique. The first involves 
challenging the picture of the world on offer here. The second demands of new 
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liberals like Slaughter a better account of what these governmental networks are for. 
What is the ethical content of transgovernmetalism? In particular, is it open to the 
same criticism as Moravcsik (1997)-that is, that it does not take politics seriously 
enough? 
The world of war, death, poverty, and resistal)ce does not feature large in 
Slaughter (2004). (When Slaughter (2004, 26) talks about Iraq she uses it as a 
concrete example of how government networks could rebuild a society. Networks of 
foreign judges could offer technical training to Iraqi judges, regulators could rebuild 
banking systems, and legislators could teach democracy.) There is little reference to 
the way in which the new world order is so congenial to what is often a highly 
exploitative capitalist class or the way in which extreme poverty is viewed as largely 
acceptable by the political classes by whom Slaughter sets so much store. Politics, 
repeatedly, is sidelined. 3 What, though, of the content of new liberal norms? What 
is it that new liberalism seeks to achieve? There is a revealing sentence toward the 
end of Slaughter's book (2004, 260 ): "the content of these specific principles is less 
important in many ways than the simple fact that there be principles:' A New World 
Order promises novelty, change, and prescription. And, as well as this, it tells us 
where, and by whom, this new order is being created. The revolutionary cl\ISS is the 
technocratic class. 
But if it is, what is it that these networks are trying, or ought to be trying, to 
create? What is the content of the new world order? No doubt, it is "a deeply 
human creation motivated by human aspiration" (Slaughter 2004, 133), but what 
is it being created for? When the underlying assumptions are that people want 
to work together to build a decent world order, then the underlying normative 
commitments surely have to be quite thin, since the deep-seated conflicts about 
the specifics are, inevitably, elided. The UN Secretary-General's Global Compact 
is a case in point. This is commended as "collective learning in action" (Slaughter 
2004, 192). The image is of corporate actors working with civil society, labor, and the 
UN to offer the global market "a human face." 4 The emphasis is on solutions and 
learning. But solutions to what? Judged by the conduct of corporations in the early 
twenty-first century, it is legitimate to argue that often what corporations want and 
what the market demands are buying and selling in the absence of a human face. 
If corporations are psychopathic then the Global Compact is likely to be hugely 
3 For example, the sharp politics of Guantanamo Bay and the anxieties it has provoked do not fea-
ture. Yet, the detention without trial of those incarcerated there is not without relevance to Slaughter's 
thesis. In particular, the four aspects of judicial comity described by Slaughter (deference, localism, 
rights, and engagement) (2004, 87) each seem relevant to the way judges have approached the detention 
of nationals in Cuba. In the English Appeal Court decision of Abbasi, for example, the Court was 
critical of the United States for breaching fundamental norms of human rights law, engaged with US 
courts over the appropriate norms to be applied, and deferred to these better-situated courts in the 
hope that they would provide resolution (see Abbasi v. Secretary of State 2002). 
4 UN Secretary-General Kofl Annan's address to the World Economic Forum, Davos, 28 jan. 1999, 
quoted in Slaughter (2004, 192). 
l 
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helpful to them in presenting a human face to the world (human faces after all are 
marketable), while continuing with business as usual (Achbar, Abbott, and Bakan 
2004). 
But Slaughter is at the vanguard of a liberal internationalism that views itself 
as progressive and humanitarian: for better "stewardship" of the earth, in favor of 
human dignity (and human rights), hostile to the death penalty, worried about 
the "excesses" of capitalism, and multilateralist (in the broadest sense). Her just 
world order is as "inclusive, tolerant, respectful and decentralised as possible" 
(Slaughter 2004, 217), but is this new liberal vision of technocratic networks thick 
enough to sustain its own normative preferences? Much of Slaughter's work is about 
procedure-more transparency, deliberative equality, legitimate difference-but 
there is not enough by way of substantive commitments. To be sure, inclusiveness 
as a procedural norm has certain substantive implications. It may be that the 
Montreal Consensus, with its emphasis on permitting "developing countries and 
poor countries [to] share in the benefits of the global economy" (Slaughter 2004, 
246), is something to support, but if this is so we want to know more about which 
networks will encourage this sort of policy, what the opposition is, and what sort of 
sacrifices need to be made to achieve a just global political economy. 
Ultimately, the "global transgovernmental constitution" (self-consciously mim-
icking the principles of }ames Madison and others), unless it grapples with the 
origins of politics and the hard choices of global redistribution, may well allow the 
reproduction of many of those hierarchies, oppressions, and substantive inequali-
ties that many new liberals sincerely wish to resist. . 
4 FoRGING A WoRLD oF LIBERTY 
UNDER LAW 
·········································································································································· 
If Moravcsik provides the theoretical muscle and Slaughter the descriptive power, 
then Forging a World of Liberty under Law (Ikenberry and Slaughter 2006-a 
restatement and development of themes found in earlier work but this time con-
joined, sometimes awkwardly, to a project to re-envisage US national security) is a 
full-blown set of policy prescriptions-an application to join the "rulership cadre 
of states, promoting wise and effective statecraft" (Kennedy 1999, 103). 
The title enunciates some of the main conceits of new liberalism. This is an order 
that, if it is to emerge, will do so not through an incremental flourishing of local 
projects or an accretion of good deeds or the facilitation of ideas and practices on a 
small scale. This is a world to be "forged;' sometimes through military intervention, 
sometimes through economic integration. It is a world of liberty (not justice or 
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equality or opportunity) in which states that practice the virtues of freedom and 
democracy will flourish. Finally, it is a world in which law is the handmaiden to 
liberty, promoting it at every turn. 
Some classic new liberal themes are prominent in this document. There is a 
call for the creation of a world of "mature liberal democracies" (Ikenberry and 
Slaughter 2006, 19 ). There is a Kantian tolerance for (imperfect) existing institu-
tions combined with the promise that much of this will be swept away by new, 
more authentically liberal institutions. Thus, there are suggestions for a tinkering 
with Security Council membership and an endorsement of the High Level Panel's 
proposal for a "Responsibility to Protect"-the latter a reaffirmation of the Rawl-
sian principle that liberal states ought to have the right to intervene in illiberal states 
(Rawls 1999; United Nations 2004). 
The Princeton Project contains a great deal of good sense (the need to update 
conceptions of deterrence), liberal ethics (concern for issues of global health, a 
genuine reaching out to the citizens of foreign states), and some political daring (a 
national gasoline tax in the United States). I am more interested, for these purposes, 
in concentrating on three proclivities that hover over this document (and cast into 
relief some of the preoccupations of new liberalism as an ideological program, 
whatever the nature of its scientific ambitions). 
First, there is a curious lack of faith in the domestic processes that are supposed 
to energize the new liberal project. Hugo Chavez, for example, a man elected three 
times, is a "populist" guilty of "fomenting a continent-wide anti-~S coalition" 
(Ikenberry and Slaughter 2006, n). This cold war rhetoric sits uneasily with the 
ardor for democratic processes on display elsewhere. A deeper contradiction lies 
at the heart of the democratic governance project in international law. It may be 
that the purpose of international law is to restrain sovereigns (liberty under law), 
but, if those sovereigns exercise authority as an expression of popular will, then 
international law must have to be, at times, antidemocratic and antilibertarian 
(Rabkin 2004; Anderson 2005, 1308-9). In Forging a World of Liberty, members of 
the Concert of Democracies are required to "pledge not to use force against one 
another" (Ikenberry and Slaughter 2006, 7). If such pledges are necessary in a world 
of democratic states, it may be because the popular will can become bellicose or 
because liberal states might have good reason to attack one another (for example, 
over remaining oil stocks, in response to mass refugee flows, because of chauvinistic 
media campaigns). It is not clear, in such cases, why international law is to be taken 
more seriously than these (sometimes warmongering) domestic preferences. 
Secondly, there is a classic split between the political and the pre-political. 
Thus, just as "preferences" have a pre-political origin, so, too, do "threats." Some 
threats, according to the authors, are political (extremists inflicting catastrophic 
damage), while others are naturally occurring and "not politically motivated" (such 
as nuclear meltdown, climate change, and infectious disease). Only an emaciated 
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buttressed by analogous divisions between culture (them) and strategy (us). Ex-
tremists, usually Islamic fascists who would "willingly martyr themselves;' are to 
be distinguished from rational actors like the Soviet Union or the United States 
(both of which participated in a deterrence regime that assumed a capacity and 
willingness to martyr whole nations). 
There is, thirdly, an unstable dual commitment to both global justice and Amer-
ican well-being. The centrality of US exceptionalism (mostly unstated in early new 
liberal work) becomes a non-negotiable norm in the Forging a World of Liberty 
proposals. The basic objective of US strategy must be "to protect ... the American 
way of life" (Ikenberry and Slaughter 2006, 14, emphasis added). What is not fully 
explained is how the American way oflife can be protected in a way that is compati-
ble with a liberal global order. It may be, instead, that the levels of consumption, the 
degree of ecological destruction, and the militarism that is required to sustain the 
American (and, indeed, Western) project are fundamentally at odds with building 
a stable and decent political order. This centrally important question is confronted 
in neither the Princeton Project document nor Slaughter's New World Order. In-
deed, sometimes the ethics of new liberalism is best demonstrated by its aporia; 
some matters (fear, retribution, poverty, the skewing effects of private wealth) are 
screened out. 
In the end, new liberalism is an important and rigorous approach to world 
politics and international relations. Its virtues are manifold (a refusal readily to 
accept the primacy of raw power, an attention to domestic spaces as engines of in-
ternational change, a genuinely parsimonious and compelling initial theorization, 
an ambitious and intellectually confident grand theory of global order). As a theory 
of politics and ethics, however, it remains insensitive to the enormity of private 
power, the subtlety of political motivation, and the intermingling of the social and 
the political. 
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